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Abstract 
 
We use different incentive schemes to study truth-telling in a die-roll task when people are asked 
to reveal the number rolled privately. We find no significant evidence of cheating when there are 
no financial incentives associated with the reports, but do find evidence of such when the reports 
determine financial gains or losses (in different treatments).  We find no evidence of loss aversion 
in the standard case in which subjects receive their earnings in a sealed envelope at the end of the 
session. When subjects manipulate the possible earnings, we find evidence of less cheating, 
particularly in the loss setting; in fact, there is no significant difference in behavior between the 
non-incentivized case and the loss setting with money manipulation.  We interpret our findings in 
terms of the moral cost of cheating and differences in the perceived trust and beliefs in the gain 
and the loss frames.   
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1. Introduction 
Many economic interactions require that individuals disclose information that they 
possess.  Examples include a car dealer selling a used car, a broker giving advice on the best 
mortgage, or a professor writing a reference letter for a student or a colleague.  In all of these 
environments with asymmetric information, it may be socially-optimal for individuals to reveal 
their information truthfully.  However, economic and personal incentives may lead people to 
deliberately misreport such information.  One may shade the truth (so common in reference letters 
as to be the norm) or simply prevaricate.  Such dishonesty is a form of cheating behavior, a term 
that also includes activities such as lying, theft, embezzlement, and bribery. 
There are noteworthy economic consequences associated with cheating behavior.  Indeed, 
Cohn, Fehr and Maréchal (2014) point to cheating in the business culture as a force that is 
plausibly responsible (at least in part) for the all-too-common scandals in business and politics.  
Tax evasion and avoidance led to diminished tax revenue of approximately €1 trillion in the 
Eurozone, according to the European Commission, and the IRS estimates the overall tax gap in 
the U.S represents about 16% of the estimated actual tax liability.  In the developing world, 
corruption and cheating are quite prevalent; numerous dictators (e.g., Suharto, Marcos, and 
Duvalier) have shamelessly looted their countries, which have suffered greatly after the fall of the 
dictatorship; such corruption hinders investment and growth.  In addition, recent experimental 
evidence has demonstrated that setting goals (Schweitzer, Ordóñez and Douma, 2004; Cadsby, 
Song and Tapon, 2010) or using policies such as team incentives (Conrads et al., 2013), random 
bonuses (Gill, Prowse and Vlassopoulos, 2013), or performance-based bonuses (Jacob and Levitt, 
2003; Martinelli et al., 2018) can exacerbate cheating behavior.  
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In this paper, we study the effects of incentives, moral costs, and framing on cheating 
behavior in gain and loss domains when people are asked to reveal a piece of private information. 
This information concerns a state of the world, whose report may only determine the payoff of the 
reporting agent.  We focus on behavior when the money to be received is framed alternatively as a 
gain or a loss to study the effects of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  There is 
evidence that loss contracts (i.e., up-front bonuses that workers can lose) increase workplace 
productivity (Brooks, Stremitzer and Tontrup, 2012; Hossain and List, 2012; Fryer et al., 2012).  
Further, workers might prefer loss contracts as a way to improve their performance and thus 
increase their expected earnings (Imas, Sadoff and Samek, 2016). Although these findings 
highlight some noteworthy effects of up-front incentives, it seems crucial to improve our 
understanding of other possible effects. For example, Cameron, Miller and Monin (2010) argue 
that paying people in advance for performing a task might induce a feeling of entitlement or 
deservingness, and this might facilitate or even encourage unethical behavior.   
We investigate whether people cheat more in a loss frame when their private information 
concerns the state of the world.  Since a loss contract usually requires that people receive the 
money in advance, we conducted treatments (in the gain and the loss frame) with and without 
having the subjects be in the presence of the money before making a decision. The aim of this 
design choice is twofold. On the one hand, our approach is methodological.  Researchers 
interested on the predicted power of loss aversion may be tempted to affect both the reference 
point (by framing earnings as gain or losses) and the “sense of ownership” (by allowing subjects 
to manipulate the potential earnings in the loss domain). Our study is an attempt to tease apart the 
possible effect of these two variables (frame and manipulability) on cheating behavior. On the 
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other hand, the manipulability of money may affect the “sense of ownership” but also could affect 
the “moral cost of lying”.   
People may feel more entitled to keep the money that they manipulate, in line with the idea 
of deservingness in Cameron, Miller and Monin (2010).  However, it may be more difficult to 
cheat and maintain a positive self-image after handling the money; thus people may refrain from 
cheating in this case.  The question of how money manipulation affects cheating behavior is 
relevant empirically, since workers with different roles or in different sectors may manipulate 
money to different degrees. For example, taxi drivers or cashiers in a department store typically 
handle money, while Uber drivers or workers in a finance department do not (or do it only on 
paper).  Similarly, some professionals do not manipulate money in their workplace while others 
do; e.g, teachers, policeman or surgeons for the former and dentists, businessmen or pharmacists 
for the later.  Although of course the opportunities for these people to cheat vary along other 
dimensions, it seems useful to investigate whether the manipulability of money has an effect on 
cheating behavior. 
We consider an environment where the outcome is independent of one’s level of talent or 
ability, so that there should in principle be no measure of one’s worth attached to the report 
(considerations of self-image and social image may nevertheless affect the reports).  We use a 
variant of the seminal design developed by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013).  Each 
participant is asked to privately roll a die (6-sided in the original experiment, 10-sided in ours), so 
that the experimenter cannot determine the veracity of the subsequent report.1  The beauty of this 
                                                            
1 Studies by, e.g., Greene and Paxton (2009), Shalvi et al. (2011), Conrads et al. (2013), Gravert (2013), Jiang (2013), Ploner and 
Regner (2013) and Hao and Houser (2017) have also used the die-rolling task.  See Abeler, Nosenzo and Raymond (2016) for a 
recent meta-study. Other studies have used the sender-receiver game where cheating is strategic (i.e., the sender needs to send a 
message to the receiver about the real state of the world and the receiver may believe it or not). This includes, among others, 
Gneezy (2005), Sutter (2009), Lundquist et al. (2009), Erat and Gneezy (2012), Erat (2013) and Vanberg (2017). Other studies in 
which subjects can misreport their private information or send cheap-talk messages include Charness (2000a), Croson, Boles and 
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design is that while the experimenter cannot know whether an individual is lying, statistical tests 
on the aggregate data show the extent to which the experimental population distorts the truth.  
Standard economic models predict that people will cheat in the absence of punishment when there 
is incentive to do so, but will otherwise be indifferent regarding telling the truth.   
We first compare behavior in a Baseline treatment where subjects receive a fixed amount 
regardless of their report with the behavior of people when their financial payoff depends on the 
reported outcome.  To our knowledge, this is the first paper that directly tests whether subjects lie 
in the absence of incentives when their behavior does not impose any payoff externality on others.  
We then proceed to examine behavior in the loss and the gain domains, with and without money 
manipulation. In our standard treatments with no money manipulation, we give subjects their 
earnings in a closed envelope at the end of the session.  We do change the reference point: In the 
gain setting, the reported number determines the amount to be placed (by the experimenter) into 
the envelope, while in the loss setting all envelopes contain the maximum possible earnings and 
we subtract an amount that depends on the reported number.  Arguably, loss aversion would 
predict more cheating with the loss framing, since giving up money would seem to be more 
unpleasant than simply not receiving money.2  To implement the treatments with money 
manipulation, participants were asked to either take their earnings from an envelope (gain 
treatment) or put money into an envelope after having received the maximum possible payoff at 
the beginning of the session (loss treatment).   
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Murnighan (2003), and Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). For recent revisions of the literature on cheating see Rosenbaum, 
Billinge and Stieglitz (2014) and Jacobsen, Fosgaard and Pascual-Ezama (2017). 
2 Garbarino, Slonim, and Villeval (2016) derive a prediction that people will lie more frequently when the probability of a (the) bad 
outcome is lower, since the higher expected payoff means that the “loss” avoided by lying compared to reference point is greater.  
They find support from an analysis of studies in the literature as well as new experiments. See also Abeler, Nosenzo and Raymond 
(2016) and Gneezy, Kajackaite and Sobel (2018) for other experiments that vary the probability of a (the) bad outcome.  
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How would loss aversion actually apply in a cheating environment? Cameron and Miller 
(2009), Cameron, Miller and Monin (2010) and Grolleau, Kocher and Sutan (2016) observe that 
loss aversion encourages cheating in real-effort tasks.  We challenge these findings by considering 
a setting in which subjects do not have to report their own performance on a task.  Their tasks 
differ from ours in that one would expect more concern about one’s social image when one’s 
ability (or “honor”) is at stake.  Previous experimental evidence (e.g., Ertac, 2011; Charness, 
Rustichini, and van de Ven, 2018) shows that people are much less accurate in processing 
information when this information is self-relevant than when it concerns an outcome that is 
unaffected by one’s level of talent.  Thus, we might expect more cheating in a self-relevant 
performance task than in our task (Gravert, 2013).3  
Perhaps the closest paper to ours is Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017).  They ask subjects 
to roll a 6-sided die 75 times and then report the number of ‘4s’ they have obtained.  While 
subjects report more ‘4s’ in the loss frame, the authors find no evidence of cheating in the gain 
frame, contrary to other experimental evidence (Abeler, Nosenzo and Raymond, 2016).  A salient 
difference between our designs is that we ask subjects to report the outcome of one die roll, while 
the multiple die rolls in Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017) allows subjects to cheat more than once 
(see also Shalvi et al. 2011, Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013).4  In addition, we complement 
their findings by looking at the effects of money manipulation and moral costs on the reported 
outcomes, as well as reporting behavior when subjects received fixed pay. 
                                                            
3 On the other hand, Kajackaite (2016) finds the opposite. It is also possible that people cheat more in the die-task because they can 
attribute a bad outcome to bad luck; it is much more difficult to do so with a real-effort task.  Thus, cheating with a die roll may 
well have a lower moral cost than with a real-effort task. Serra-Garcia, Van Damme and Potters (2013) is another study that 
compares how people cheat about what they observe and what they do. In their setting, two subjects play a public-goods game with 
asymmetric information. In one of the conditions, the informed subject knows the return from contributing and can lie about it, 
while in another treatment the informed subject can lie about his contribution to the public good. Although there should be no 
difference across these two conditions (messages are cheap talk and do not affect the payoffs), Serra-Garcia, Van Damme and 
Potters (2013) find that subjects lie more about what they observe than about what they did.  
4 Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017) consider a second study in mTurk, where subjects self-report the outcome of tossing a coin 
(Bucciol, and Piovesan, 2011).  In this task, where cheating is a binary decision, Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017) find that 
cheating occurs in both the gain and the loss frame, with more cheating being observed in the later.  
  6 
A moral cost of cheating has been useful to explain why we observe truth-shading rather 
than universal reporting of either the true value or the maximum value in previous experiments.  
With the mounting evidence on lying behavior, some recent models include a term for the moral 
cost of lying but restrict this to be a function of the distance between the material payoff from 
lying and that from not lying (e.g., Lundquist et al. 2009; Hilbig and Hessler 2013).  However, it 
seems likely that other arguments should be present in a function reflecting the moral cost of 
dishonesty.  For example, Utikal and Fischbacher (2013) find that nuns tend to under-report the 
die roll, perhaps wishing to appear modest in their demands. Subjects also refrain from cheating 
when the opportunity is made particularly salient (Mazar, Amir and Ariely 2008; Gino, Ayal and 
Ariely 2009).  The meta-study in Abeler, Nosenzo and Raymond (2016) indeed concludes that the 
desire to appear honest may be a key driving force in explaining cheating behavior in the die-
rolling task.5  We assume that the moral costs are the same in the Gain and Loss treatments and 
depend only on the extent to which subjects distort the truth; i.e., the moral cost is a function of 
the difference between the true outcome and the reported one.  We expect, however, that moral 
concerns will interact with the motivation to cheat.  Our study is an attempt to better understand 
the interplay between incentives to cheat in the gain and loss domain and the moral costs of 
cheating. 
 In fact, some of our experimental results seem surprising.  We do find evidence across 
many of our treatments that cheating is more frequent when this affects the reporter’s material 
payoffs than when it doesn’t.  However, in the standard treatments where participants simply 
receive their payoffs in an envelope at the end of the session, we find no evidence of more lying 
with a loss frame than with a gain frame.  We feel that two elements could have helped to induce 
                                                            
5 See also Rosenbaum, Billinge and Stieglitz (2014), Dufwenberg and Dufwenberg (2016), Kajackaite and Gneezy (2017) and 
Jacobsen, Fosgaard and Pascual-Ezama (2017) for related evidence, and Mazar, Amir and Ariely (2008) for a theory of self-
concept maintenance. 
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this finding.  First, reports are constrained to be one of the 10 possible outcomes of the die roll.  If 
subjects cheat maximally in the gain treatment (given their moral costs), one cannot observe more 
cheating in the loss frame.  Second, the sense of ownership might have been weak in this design. 
We addressed these points in our treatments where the participants actually physically 
handle the money.  Indeed, requiring the participants to do so led to less cheating.  To our 
surprise, however, this had greater effects in the loss frame than in the gain frame, as we find 
substantially less cheating in this loss treatment than in the corresponding gain treatment.  In fact, 
there is no significant difference between behavior in the baseline treatment and in the loss 
treatment with money manipulation!  Our finding that money manipulation is important to 
cheating behavior also holds when we consider an alternative viewpoint of our treatments; e.g., 
we can interpret that subjects who manipulate the money in the gain frame (by subtracting the 
money from the envelope) are indeed taking their decision in the domain of losses. Loss aversion 
predicts that they will cheat more than when money is not in front of them, which does not seem 
to occur.  Our sense is that this is not a refutation of loss aversion per se, but rather indicates how 
the moral costs of being dishonest vary across conditions and affect behavior.  It may well feel 
like much more of a real breach to pocket money with which one feels one has been entrusted in 
advance than money one has found. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  We present the experimental design, 
implementation, and hypotheses in Section 2, and describe the experimental results in Section 3.  
We provide some discussion in Section 4.  Section 5 concludes.   
 
2. Experimental Design and hypotheses 
2.1. Experimental design 
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All sessions were run at the Laboratory for Research in Experimental Economics 
(LINEEX) at the University of Valencia. A total of 426 subjects were recruited to participate 
using the electronic recruitment system of the laboratory. Following Fischbacher and Follmi-
Heusi (2013), we added our experiment to the end of a previous experiment that took around 90 
minutes.6  These were aimed at eliciting social time preferences (Rodriguez-Lara and Ponti, 2017) 
and examining behavior in a bank-run problem (Kinateder, Kiss and Pintér, 2018; Kiss, 
Rodriguez-Lara and Rosa-Garcia, 2018).  Our experiment was presented as an independent task to 
subjects, in which they could earn some additional money.  Subjects did not receive any feedback 
about the previous experiment when they decided to participate in our task (all subjects decided to 
participate).   
Subjects received a 10-sided die and a copy of the experimental instructions.7  Their task 
consisted of rolling the die privately in their cubicles and reporting the number from the first roll 
on the computer screen. Subjects could roll the die as many times as desired, but were told that 
only the first throw was relevant for their payment. We used the z-tree software (Fischbacher, 
2007) to collect information about the reports. 
Table 1: Payoffs (in Euros) in each treatment depending on the reported number (0 to 9) 
 
Reported number 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Baseline 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Gain treatments 0 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
Loss treatments -5 -4 -3.5 -3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 
 
                                                            
6 This procedure is frequently used in the literature due to the short nature of the task and the opportunity to avoid paying two 
separate show-up fees. See Section B1 in Appendix B for further details about the previous experiments.  
7 We use a 10-sided die to increase the number of possible outcomes and have more variability in our data. A translated version of 
the instructions can be found in Appendix A. 
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We had five different treatments, which varied the payoffs that subjects received for 
reporting the outcome of the dice and the extent to which subjects handled their potential 
earnings.  In the Baseline treatment, subjects received a fixed payment of 2.5 Euros in a sealed 
envelope at the end of the session, regardless of the reported outcome. In the Gain (Loss) 
treatments, payoffs associated to each report were framed as positive (negative) monetary payoffs 
to be received (retuned) by subjects (see Table 1).  The experimenter was in charge of paying or 
subtracting these payoffs from subjects in treatments with no money manipulation.  In treatments 
with money manipulation, subjects needed to pay or return the corresponding amount themselves.  
This was implemented by using envelopes.  In treatments with no money manipulation, the 
experimenter was in the possession of the envelopes for the payments, as in the Baseline 
treatment.  In treatments with money manipulation, subjects had the envelope on their tables and 
needed to take money or return money depending on their reports.   
We attempt to give loss aversion its best chance, thus the initial endowment was 
mentioned to all subjects participating in the Loss treatments at the beginning of the session (“You 
have received an initial amount of 5 Euros for participating in an experiment that follows the one 
that is about to start. From now, this money belongs to you. Next, we will explain to you the 
instructions of the first experiment.”). In the treatment with no money manipulation, this message 
was read aloud at the beginning of the session. Subjects participating in the loss treatment with 
money manipulation were also physically given the 5 Euros when they entered the room. 
Next, we summarize our treatment conditions and the procedures: 
• Baseline treatment (Baseline): At the end of the session, subjects received a sealed 
envelope with a fixed amount (2.5€), regardless of the number they reported.  
 
• Gain with no money manipulation (Gain-NO): As in the Baseline, subjects received 
their earnings in a sealed envelope at the end of the session. In this treatment, earnings 
ranged between 0€ (when reporting 0) and 5€ (when reporting 9).  
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• Loss with no money manipulation (Loss-NO): Before starting the session, subjects were 
informed that they had been allocated with an initial endowment of 5€ to be kept in an 
envelope by the experimenter. Subjects were told that this would be used in a subsequent 
experiment. After finishing the first experiment (90 minutes), subjects were reminded 
about their 5€ and presented with our task. Subjects knew that the reported number would 
determine the amount to be deducted from the envelope. The envelope was given to 
subjects at the end of the session.  
 
• Gain with money manipulation (Gain-MM): Again, earnings increased with the 
reported number but subjects had an envelope with 5€ on their desk before rolling the die. 
Each subject had to extract their earnings from the envelope upon rolling the die and 
reporting the outcome on the computer screen.  
 
• Loss with money manipulation (Loss-MM): Subjects received the initial endowment 
(5€) at the beginning of the session and were informed that they had been allocated with 
this initial endowment, as in the Loss-NO treatment. After finishing the first experiment 
(90 minutes), subjects were given an empty envelope. They rolled the die, reported the 
outcome, and placed the amount to be returned in the envelope before leaving the room.8 
 
 
Before proceeding to the hypotheses, there are some aspects of our experimental design 
that are worth mentioning. First, we explained nothing about the cheating experiment when 
subjects participated in our first experiment; i.e., the instructions of our experiment were 
presented to subjects only once the first experiment had been completed. Second, earnings 
associated with each reported number were equivalent in the Gain and the Loss treatments. Third, 
subjects in the money-manipulation treatments had a second opportunity to cheat by misreporting 
the amount of money they had to take from or leave in the envelope.  In this respect, our evidence 
is consistent with Cameron and Miller (2009) or Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017); we do not find 
that subjects recorded an outcome that did not correspond to the amount of money they took from 
or left into the envelope.  Finally, we should acknowledge the alternative view of one of the 
referees, who suggested that our treatments with no money manipulation could be considered to 
                                                            
8 When giving them the initial endowment, we observe that roughly 1/3 of the subjects decided to leave the money on the table, 
while the rest put it in their pockets. We cannot determine if these subjects behave differently but we tried to minimize this 
problem by asking participants in the Loss-MM to put their initial endowment on the table before rolling the die.   
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be Gain treatments because subjects received their earnings at the end of the session, while 
money-manipulation treatments are Loss treatments because subjects had their earnings in front of 
them. We believe that it would not be easy to rationalize the announcement of the initial 
endowment of 5 Euros and the negative payoffs associated with the reports in the Loss-NO to a 
Gain frame. However, we discuss how our data reconcile with this viewpoint when we present our 
hypotheses and our results below.  
 
2.2. Model and hypotheses  
 
After rolling the die and observing the (true) outcome T, subjects can report any number R, 
where T, R ∈ X = {0, 1,…., 9}. Let m: X → ℝ denote the monetary outcome associated each 
possible outcome of the die, where mT ≥ 0 (mR ≥ 0) stands for the earnings associated with the 
true (reported) outcome, respectively. We assume that subjects have a separable utility function as 
follows: 
(1) U (T, R) = v (mR | e) – c (T, R) 
 
where v (mR | e) denotes the material utility associated with the report and c (T, R) measures the 
moral cost of cheating; this determines the disutility subjects experience when reporting an 
outcome that differs from the observed one. We build on the idea of reference-dependent utility 
(e.g., Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2009; Abeler et al., 2011) and loss aversion (e.g., Kahenman and 
Tversky, 1979; Köbberling and Wakker, 2005) to model the way in which subjects assess their 
earnings. As any report R!∈ X is associated to a monetary outcome mR!≥ 0, we denote v (mR) the 
utility that subjects derive from reporting R!∈ X.  In addition, subjects who received an initial 
endowment e > 0, use it a reference point; thus any amount mR that exceeds (falls below) their 
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initial endowment will be evaluated as a gain (loss) in utility using the function !!!! !! !– !! !with ! ≥ 0. This, in turn, implies that material utility v (mR | e) associated with the 
report can be written as follows: 
 
(2) v (mR | e) = 
!! !! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!if!!!! = 0!!! !! !+ !β!!! !! !– !! !!!!!!!if!!!! > 0  
 
where v (!! − !!) is positive whenever the amount associated with the report exceeds the initial 
endowment, whereas v (!! − !!) is negative when the  amount associated with the reports are 
below the initial endowment. We further assume that the value function v (x) is increasing in x 
(i.e., !′(!) !> !0), concave for gains (i.e., !”(!) !> !0) and convex for losses, (!”(!) !> !0!!"#!!! <!0). To capture the idea of loss aversion, v (x) is steeper for losses than for gains to capture, i.e., 
v´(−x) > v´(x) > 0, for x > 0). We also assume that v (x) is a piece-wise function with v (−x) = −!λ 
v (x), where λ > 1 indicates that losses loom larger than equal-sized gains (Köbberling and 
Wakker, 2005).9 The cost function c(.) is non-negative, c (T, T) = 0 and c (T, R) is increasing in T 
– R (see, e.g., Abeler, Nosenzo and Raymond, 2016; Gneezy, Kajackaite and Sobel, 2018).10  
We can compare the utility of subjects when they report the true outcome and any other 
outcome R > T.  It follows that subjects cheat if: 
 
(3) v (mR | e)  – v (mT | e) > c (T – R) 
 
                                                            
9 We assume separability between the benefits associated to the report and the cost of cheating (see, e.g., Gneezy, Kajackaite and 
Sobel 2018). The assumption that v (x) is piece-wise linear is common for small values of x (e.g., Abeler et al. 2011).  
10 Consistent with previous theoretical models and the preponderance of the observed evidence, we assume subjects never report an 
outcome R < T in our model.  
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Consider first the Baseline treatment, where subjects receive no endowment and lying has 
no benefit; in fact, subjects receive mR = 2.5 regardless of the reported outcome thus v (mR | e) = v 
(mT | e) for every R ∈ {0, 1,…., 9}. Because of the moral costs of cheating, we expect that subjects 
will report truthfully in the Baseline treatment; in fact, c (T, R) can only be 0 when subjects report 
the true outcome (see footnote 10); thus we should observe an equal distribution of outcomes in 
this treatment.11  Our first prediction is: 
Hypothesis 1:  The distribution of reports in the Baseline treatment is not significantly different 
from the uniform distribution.  
 
In all of our treatments except the Baseline, people have a financial incentive to cheat.  In 
the Gain treatments, v (mR | e) =!!! !!  > v (mT | e) = !! !! . In the Loss treatments, v (mR | e) 
=!!! !! − !!!λ!!! ! −!! !and v (mT | e) =!!! !! − !!!λ!!! ! −!! .! Because!! ≥ !! > !! 
it follows that v (mR | e) > v (mT | e) for any R > T.  If people value money and the cost of lying is 
not extreme, we should expect to see reports in the Gain and Loss treatments that are significantly 
higher than that in either the uniform distribution or the Baseline.  Thus, our second hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2:  The numbers reported in the Gain and Loss treatments will be significantly higher 
than those in the uniform distribution and in the Baseline.  
 
We turn to equations (2) and (3) to rationalize our hypotheses on the effects of loss 
aversion and money manipulation. In line with the literature on loss aversion and a plausible link 
between loss aversion and choices made with gain and loss frames, we expected more cheating 
with loss framing.  This is because subjects who misreport the outcome in the Gain treatment 
associate it with a gain in utility V G = v (mR | e) – v (mT | e) = v (mR) – v (mT) > 0.  In the Loss 
treatment, the gain in utility includes an additional component, which stands for the extra loss that 
                                                            
11 We are not aware of any other paper that directly tests for cheating behavior in the absence of economic incentives. 
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subjects avoid.  In particular, V L = (mR | e) – v (mT | e) = v (mR) – v (mT) + !!!λ![!! ! −!!  – !! ! −!! ] >  V G, where e ≥!mR!> mT.  In both the gain and the loss frames, the cost of cheating 
c (T, R) depends only on the difference between the outcome and the report, since c (T, R) is a 
function of T – R.  This, in turn, implies that when subjects evaluate the possibility of 
misreporting the true outcome in the gain and the loss frames, the cost will be the same in both 
domains. This leads to our third hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  The numbers reported in a Loss treatment will be significantly higher than those 
reported in the corresponding Gain treatment.  
 
 
While cheating has clear financial benefits in the Loss and Gain treatments, it may also 
have a moral cost, e.g., subjects might be averse to cheat due to social image (the choice is 
observed by the experimenter, as in Gneezy, Kajackaite and Sobel, 2018), a desire to hold a 
positive self image (e.g., Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 2008), or some form of guilt aversion (e.g., 
Battagalli and Dufwenberg, 2007, 2009). We aim at manipulating the cost of cheating in our 
experiment by affecting the cost function c (T – R) in equation (3) through varying whether people 
handle the money. We feel that asking people to handle their potential earnings will tend to 
increase the moral cost of lying.  This is because those who must take money from the envelope or 
place it into the envelope may feel it is more difficult to maintain their self-image after cheating, 
compared with the case in which the experimenter manipulates the money.  In fact, there are other 
mechanisms that can explain why the cost function c (T – R) may be larger in the presence of 
money manipulation.  For example, people tend to refrain from cheating when this becomes 
salient (Mazar, Amir, and Ariely, 2008; Gino, Ayal, and Ariely 2009), which may apply in the 
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treatments with money manipulation.12  Since a higher moral cost of cheating leads to less 
cheating, we have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The numbers reported in the money-manipulation treatments will be lower than in 
the corresponding treatments without money manipulation (because of the moral cost of cheating).  
 
Our hypotheses 1 to 4 rely on the implicit cost-benefit analysis of equation (3).  We 
constructed our Gain and Loss treatments so as to affect the left-hand-side of the equation,  
v (mR | e) – v (mT | e), while the effects of the money manipulation on the moral costs of cheating 
alter the right-hand-side of the equation, c (T – R).  It is worth noticing, however, that the 
subjects’ utility function also depends on the value of their initial endowment, which serves as a 
reference point to subjects. This is relevant to Hypothesis 4, where the implicit assumption is that 
handling the money does not affect the value of the initial endowment; that is, in the Gain and 
Loss treatments the value of the endowment is the same with and without the manipulation of 
money. One may argue that when subjects see the potential earnings on the table in the Gain-MM 
or receive their endowment in advance in the Loss-MM, they may feel more deserving to keep it.  
If such “sense of ownership” exists, it could compensate for the moral cost of cheating discussed 
above and result in more cheating when people handle the money, compared with the case in 
which the experimenter does.  This hypothesis goes back to the alternative viewpoint discussed in 
Section 2.1, which predicts more cheating when people manipulate the endowment because 
earnings on the table can be viewed as potential losses.  We account for this possibility in our final 
hypothesis, which is an alternative to Hypothesis 4.  
                                                            
12 Gneezy, Kajackaite and Sobel (2018) argue that the utility function should incorporate a term that accounts for the 
fact that people value honest behavior or being perceived as honest; see also Garbarino, Slonim, and Villeval (2016) 
or Abeler, Nosenzo and Raymond (2016). In our setting, it seems reasonable to assume that people will be perceived 
as being more honest when they report truthfully in treatments with money manipulation, which would lead to less 
cheating in these treatments, as a result.  
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Hypothesis 4’: The numbers reported in the money-manipulation treatments will be larger than 
in the corresponding treatments without money manipulation (because subjects will feel more 
entitled to keep the money that they manipulate).  
 
To formalize this Hypothesis 4’ consider that the value of the endowment with money 
manipulation (eMM) is larger than the value of the endowment with no money manipulation (eNO). 
In Gain-NO, subjects receive no endowment (eNO = 0), thus any report is associated with a gain in 
utility v(mR).  In Gain-MM, subjects see the potential earnings on their table (eMM = 5) thus any 
report will be associated a loss in utility, !v(mR – eMM). By using our arguments above, we can 
show that v(mR |eMM) – v(mT |eMM) > v(mR |eNO) – v (mT|eNO) thus more cheating would be expected in 
the Gain treatment with money manipulation. The same holds in the Loss treatment after noticing 
that v (mR |e) – v(mT|e) = v(mR) – v(mT) + !λ[! ! −!!  – ! ! −!! ] and the value function !! !  
is concave; therefore  ! !!! −!!  – ! !!! −!!  <!! !!" −!!  – ! !!" −!!  , where eMM > 
eNO ≥ !! > !! .  
 
3. Results 
 
Figure 1 displays the distribution of the reported numbers in each of the treatments. The 
horizontal line at .1 indicates the expected frequency if reports followed the theoretical uniform 
distribution. Table 2 summarizes our data by including information on the cumulative distribution 
of reported numbers.  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of reported numbers per treatment 
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The average reported number is above the mean expected outcome (that predicted by the 
uniform distribution) of 4.5 in all the treatments.  In fact, more high numbers (5-9) are reported 
than low numbers (0-4) in all treatments.  Consistent with previous findings (Fischbacher and 
Föllmi-Heusi 2013, Utikal and Fischbacher 2013, Shalvi et al. 2011, Abeler, Nosenzo and 
Raymond 2016), there is no single large spike at the payoff-maximizing outcome.13 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean, standard error and cumulative frequency of reports 
Treatment Obs. Mean SE 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Baseline 88 4.977 0.304 0.046 0.159 0.284 0.364 0.398 0.511 0.602 0.761 0.898 1.000 
Gain-NO 89 6.281 0.270 0.034 0.067 0.101 0.168 0.236 0.326 0.416 0.596 0.775 1.000 
Loss-NO 84 6.214 0.291 0.048 0.095 0.143 0.179 0.202 0.298 0.440 0.619 0.761 1.000 
                                                            
13 We also note that there is no significant gender difference in any of the five treatments. The overall average number 
reported by males (females) was 5.849 (5.633).  The overall proportion of zeroes reported by males (females) was 
0.050 (0.048), while the proportion of nines reported by males (females) was 0.171 (0.172). See, among others, 
Cappelen, Sorensen, and Tungodden (2012), Childs (2012), Ezquerra, Kolev and Rodriguez-Lara (2018), Gylfason 
Arnardottir and Kristinsson (2013), and Pascual-Ezama, Prelec and Dunfield (2015) for other studies showing no 
gender differences in cheating behavior. 
  18 
Gain-MM 84 5.952 0.271 0.036 0.095 0.119 0.179 0.262 0.333 0.429 0.714 0.881 1.000 
Loss-MM 81 5.198 0.332 0.086 0.148 0.235 0.309 0.432 0.506 0.556 0.704 0.827 1.000 
 
We proceed to test our hypotheses with both non-parametric tests and regression analysis. 
First, the Kruskal-Wallis test rejects the hypothesis that observations in the different treatments 
come from the same distribution (!!! = 14.95, p = 0.005), thus monetary incentives and/or the 
manipulation of money seems to affect the reported outcomes. 
The results of our non-parametric analysis are summarized in Table 3. We first investigate 
whether the reported outcomes in each of the treatments differ from the actual expected outcomes 
(i.e., the equal distribution) using a !! test; see column (1). Using Wilcoxon rank-sum and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, we compare the reports in the Gain and Loss treatments with those in 
the Baseline; see columns (2) and (3). 14  
Hypothesis 1 states that there will be no difference between reports in the Baseline 
treatment and the expected outcomes of the die roll.  In fact, while we do see a slight tendency 
towards reporting higher numbers, the !! test shows no significant difference between the reports 
in the Baseline and the actual expected outcomes (p = 0.213).  Thus, when there is no financial 
incentive for misreporting, we see no evidence of significant distortion in the reports made (see 
Tables B2 and B3 in the Appendix for further evidence of no cheating in the Baseline treatment).  
Table 3: Non-parametric analysis on differences from expected true reports and baseline reports 
 
 Expected true reports Baseline reports 
Treatment (1) !!test (2) Wilcoxon rank-sum (Z) (3) Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) 
                                                            
14 Throughout the paper, we round all p-values to three decimal places. The interested reader on the comparison between the 
reported outcomes in each treatment and expected actual outcomes using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test or the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test of cumulative distributions can consult Appendix B (Table B1).  This includes information on the fraction of subjects who 
cheat to avoid the worst possible outcome using the estimation method in Garbarino, Slonim and Villeval (2016).  
  19 
Baseline 12.00 (0.213) - - 
Gain-NO 38.98 (0.000) 3.128 (0.001) 0.195 (0.024) 
Loss-NO 39.57 (0.000) 2.880 (0.002) 0.213 (0.013) 
Gain-MM 45.11 (0.000) 2.165 (0.015)  0.070  (0.039) 
Loss-MM 11.72 (0.230) 0.610 (0.271) 0.185  (0.488) 
Note: p-values (parentheses) reflect one-tailed tests. 
Result 1. There is no significant evidence of cheating in the absence of economic incentives. 
We expected more cheating in our four treatments where there is a financial incentive to 
report a higher number than was actually rolled, as stated in Hypothesis 2.  Indeed, the Gain-NO 
and Loss-NO treatments show much higher numbers than the expected true outcomes (p = 0.001) 
or the Baseline (p = 0.024). There is also evidence in the Gain-MM treatment of distortion relative 
to the expected outcomes (p = 0.001) and the Baseline (p = 0.039).  However, there is surprisingly 
little difference between the reports made in the Loss-MM and Baseline treatments or between the 
reports in Loss-MM and the expected actual outcomes, even with a one-tailed test (p = 0.230). 
 
Result 2. Providing financial incentives for lying increases reported numbers in all treatments 
except in the Loss-MM, where the distribution of reported numbers does not significantly differ 
from the expected actual outcomes and the Baseline distribution.  
 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that presumed loss aversion will manifest in more cheating in 
reports made in the loss frame than those made in the gain frame.   As suggested in the preceding 
paragraph, the observed patterns do not support this hypothesis.  In fact, there is very little 
difference in the reports across the Gain-NO and Loss-NO; the average report is in fact only 
slightly higher in the Gain-NO treatment (6.281 versus 6.214).  The respective one-tailed test 
statistics and p-values are Z = -0.089, p = 0.536 and KS = 0.042, p = 0.500.  What may be even 
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more surprising is that there is substantially less cheating in Loss-MM than in Gain-MM.  In any 
case, we have strong evidence to reject Hypothesis 3 in the money-manipulation treatments. 
 
Result 3. There is an equal amount of cheating in the gain and loss domains when there is no 
money manipulation. If there is no money manipulation, less cheating is observed in the loss 
domain than in the gain domain.  
 
Finally, Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 4’ predict that money manipulation will affect the 
reported outcomes.  We find strong support for the hypothesis that money manipulation leads to 
less cheating, perhaps due to an increased moral cost of lying when we compare reports made in 
the Loss-MM and Loss-NO treatments (Hypothesis 4).  In fact, the median (modal) report in the 
Loss-MM treatment is 5 (7), while the median (modal) report in the Loss-NO treatment is 7 (9).  
The Wilcoxon test gives Z = 2.128, p = 0.016, while the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test gives KS = 
0.230, p = 0.008, both one-tailed tests.  The differences across the reports in the Gain-MM and 
Gain-NO treatments are considerably more modest and not statistically significant using a non-
parametric approach, but also favor Hypothesis 4 in that people cheat less when they manipulate 
money; the modal report in the Gain-MM (Gain-NO) is 7 (9).  Here the Wilcoxon test gives Z = 
1.144, p = 0.126, while the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test gives KS = 0.119, p = 0.254, both one-tailed 
tests.  Thus, we see that money manipulation affects the moral cost of cheating and makes a real 
difference with a loss frame, but much less of a difference with a gain frame.  
 
Result 4. Money manipulation reduces cheating behavior, especially with the loss frame.  
 
We now proceed to regression analysis.  In Table 4, we report the results of a Tobit 
analysis, where the set of independent variables include dummies for the gain frame and the 
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manipulation of money, as well as the interaction term.15  The reported standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the session level.  Our regression analysis uses the data from all 
treatments except the Baseline.  Our first regression in column (1) considers all treatments in 
which there are financial incentives to cheat.  Specifications (2) to (5) give the results for different 
Tobit models, depending on whether or not subjects manipulate the money and the frame. Recall 
that our task was added at the end of a previous session.  Our estimates in column (a) do not 
account for the behavior in the previous experiment. We show in column (b) that our findings are 
robust after controlling for the type of the preceding experiment (time preferences or bank runs) 
and the earnings of subjects in these experiments.16  
 
- Table 4 about here - 
 
First, the third row shows that money manipulation leads to smaller reported numbers and 
so presumably less cheating.  When there is no money manipulation, behavior does not differ 
significantly across the Gain and Loss frames.  Money manipulation does reduce the reported 
outcomes, especially in the loss frame; in fact, subjects cheat more in the Gain than in the Loss 
treatment with money-manipulation.17  While we argue that this result reflects a difference in 
moral costs, it nevertheless does not per se provide any support for loss aversion. This is true even 
                                                            
15 We note that ordinary least squares regressions provide qualitatively the same results and similar levels of significance. See 
Appendix B (Table B3 and Table B4) for further analysis and robustness checks. 
16 Although participants in our experiment were not informed about their earnings in the prior experiments, one may argue that 
they could had formed some beliefs to be used as a reference point. The correlation between the previous earnings and the reports 
in each of the treatment is negative but never significant (p > 0.165). Appendix B presents further details about the previous 
experiments and show that the reports are independent of the previous task or the role of subjects in these experiments (see 
Sections B1 and B2). 
17 Note that the effect of the money manipulation in the Gain frames becomes significant when we control for the previous 
experiment.  
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if we consider that treatments with money manipulation to be Loss frames; in fact, our data lend 
no support for Hypothesis 4’, that money manipulation leads to more cheating. 
 
 
4. Discussion 
Our results confirm some expected patterns.  For example, people do not lie much when 
there is no financial incentive to report an outcome different from the one that actually occurred; 
we find no significant difference between the reports made in this environment and the expected 
distribution of actual outcomes.  We also observe considerable dishonesty when there is a 
financial incentive to report a higher number, which is consistent with previous work.  Finally, 
money manipulation seems to affect the moral cost of cheating and thus the reported outcomes, in 
a way that suggests that people care about their self-image or they way they are viewed by others. 
But some other results are largely surprising.  We expected to find evidence of more 
cheating when earnings associated with the report were framed as a loss, but we found none in a 
standard environment.  When we conducted treatments where the participants were given 
envelopes with the funds and then had to physically handle the money, we observe less cheating 
in our loss frame than in our gain frame!  In fact, there was only a modest and insignificant 
difference in the reports in the Baseline treatment and the loss frame with money manipulation.   
What could explain these unexpected results?  First, an important consideration regarding 
loss aversion is the reference point for gains and losses, which very well may be unclear in 
laboratory settings (Terzi et al. 2016).  Second, while loss aversion and reference dependence are 
widely accepted, the generality of loss aversion may in fact be less than universal.  A number of 
studies (e.g., Erev, Ert, and Yechiam, 2008; Harinck et al., 2007; Kermer et al., 2006) examining 
the effect of losses in decision-making under risk and uncertainty in fact find no evidence of loss 
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aversion, as is the result in our standard treatments.18  Third, it is possible that subjects in our gain 
and loss treatments were already cheating maximally (given their moral costs), thus the 
(constrained) task prevented us to find more cheating under loss aversion; the spikes are in fact at 
the maximum value in the standard treatments. 
After having observed no difference in behavior across the Gain-NO and Loss-NO 
treatments, we made matters (literally) more hands-on by having subjects manipulate the money.  
We attempted to give loss aversion its best chance by announcing the 5-Euro prize they had been 
allocated as early as possible, in an effort to enhance the sense of ownership.  Our findings lend 
support for the idea that money manipulation influences the moral cost of cheating.  The spikes at 
higher numbers other than the maximum value in these treatments suggest that many people who 
choose to lie do not wish to be seen as a liar (in fact by far the highest spike in all of the data is the 
spike at 7 in the Gain-MM treatment).19  
Trust and morality are important and people may be sensitive to small clues and 
considerations (Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 2008).  We suspect that if one feels trusted, one is more 
likely to respond in an honest or trustworthy manner.  This could explain why people cheat less 
with money manipulation, although keeping the money with which one has been entrusted may 
feel more like stealing than taking money that one has been invited to take.20  If one is given 
money and hold it in one’s possession, one may feel that one has been trusted (the mental-
cheating condition could be seen as being a strong demand effect).  In our experiment, one’s 
                                                            
18 In fact, Harinck et al. (2007) find evidence of reversed loss aversion in a series of experiments where subjects are asked to rate 
how (un)pleasant would be finding (losing) small amounts of money.  They argue that negative feelings associated with small 
losses may be outweighed by positive feelings associated with equivalent small gains. A similar argument applies to our setting; 
the unpleasant feelings may refer to moral costs of being dishonest, while the positive feelings are associated to being honest and 
reporting the actual outcome.  
19 To our surprise, however, our null result does not appear to have been driven by a lack of a sense of “ownership” of the funds, 
since we find no evidence of loss aversion in the money-manipulation treatments.   
20 In a sense, this resembles the idea of omission-commission in Spranca, Minsk and Baron (1991). However, participants in our 
experiment are always asked to enter the number they have obtained in the computer screen, thus cheating requires acts of 
commission even in the loss condition (Cameron and Miller, 2009)   
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feelings about lying are also likely to be affected by one’s beliefs about what is expected.  If the 
feeling of being trusted leads to different beliefs about what is expected, it could be the case that 
one believes that the trustor believes that one will behave in a trustworthy manner; otherwise, one 
may experience disutility from guilt (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli and 
Dufwenberg, 2007, 2009; Battigalli, Charness, and Dufwenberg, 2013). 
Perhaps people in the money-manipulation treatments had different beliefs about the 
expectations of the experimenter than people in the other variable-pay treatments.  Specifically, 
people in the money-manipulation loss treatment were perhaps more likely to feel trusted with the 
full potential payoff in the beginning and might have had different beliefs about the beliefs of the 
experimenter than people in the corresponding gain treatment.  Having been endowed with visible 
money in the beginning of an experiment in the loss frame may also make cheating more salient 
than having an envelope from which people can later take money.   Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 
(2008) and Gino, Ayal, and Ariely (2009) find that subjects cheat less when cheating is salient as 
it more difficult is to maintain the self-image of being honest. Along these lines, Gneezy, 
Kajackaite, and Sobel (2018) incorporate an additional term in the utility function so that subjects 
value honest behavior or being perceived as honest, even when the true outcomes cannot be 
observed and thus cheating cannot be detected.   
By asking subjects to return the money in the loss treatment, we might also trigger impure 
altruism (Andreoni, 1989, 1990). The decision to return money could then be associated with 
warm-glow giving, especially in the money-manipulation loss treatment, where subjects had to 
place the amount to be returned in an envelope.  Finally, subjects could also have different 
attitudes towards losing the money in the loss treatments with and without the manipulation of 
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money, as paper losses may be treated differently from realized losses (Weber and Zuchel 2005; 
Imas, 2016); this could reflect mental accounting (Thaler, 1985). 
One might nevertheless wonder why there was more cheating in the loss frame than in the 
gain frame in other studies.  In our study, there is nothing regarding one’s own ability, while the 
work of Cameron and Miller (2009), Cameron, Miller and Monin (2010) and Grolleau, Kocher 
and Sutan (2016) involves reporting one’s own performance in a cognitive task.  One’s judgment 
about own ability seems to be more malleable than one’s judgment about events over which one 
has no control, as seen in the updating studies mentioned earlier.  Indeed, lying is likely to have 
some moral cost, but one would like to appear talented or capable in the eyes of those who may be 
watching or even one’s self; in fact, this may not even be a conscious tendency (see Charness, 
Rustichini, and van de Ven, 2018).21  Using the die-roll task, Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017) 
allows for multiple rolls of the die and find that reports are larger under loss aversion, but the 
authors do not find evidence that people cheat in a gain setting.  We complement their findings by 
also considering the effects of the moral costs, which seems to be a crucial element in 
understanding cheating behavior.   
The moral cost of lying or cheating may well be higher when one feels entrusted with 
money and has actually handled the money (as was the case in the Loss-MM treatment).  It may 
feel like more of a personal breach when one is given money and one absconds with it.22  One 
may well be more honest when one feels more trusted or responsible.  Some evidence for this 
notion is provided in Charness (2000b), while Mazar, Amir and Ariely (2008) and Gino, Ayal and 
Ariely (2009) provide evidence that subjects refrain from cheating when the opportunity is made 
                                                            
21 Some people even seem to care about reporting a higher number in the Baseline treatment, since more high numbers (5-9) are 
reported than low numbers in this case – more than 60% of the reports are high numbers.  
22 In the loss treatments (Loss-No and Loss-MM) subjects knew about or received the 5-Euros when they entered the room.  In 
both settings, we induced the reference point at the beginning, so it should be the manipulation of money (not the point at which 
earnings were announced) that drives the results.  
  26 
particularly salient (see also Jacobsen, Fosgaard and Pascual-Ezama (2017) for a discussion).  
Finally, Campbell (1935), May and Loyd (1993) and Haines et al. (1986) find that an honor 
system induces more honesty than does a proctor.  
 The results for loss aversion in our experiments surprised us.  One might argue that the 
sense of ownership was not sufficiently strong in our standard treatments, although our 
mechanism was similar to others used previously.  One might also argue that loss aversion was 
indeed present in the money-manipulation treatments, but that it was swamped by the relatively 
high moral cost of lying in the Loss-MM treatment.  While further research is needed to 
disentangle these considerations, our evidence nevertheless suggests that loss aversion was not a 
strong force in our experiments. 
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5. Conclusion 
Our paper investigates cheating behavior when experimental participants are asked to 
reveal a piece of private information that does not reflect on their personal ability and where one’s 
choice does not affect the financial payoffs of other participants.  This information concerns the 
result of a die roll.  In the Baseline treatment, there is no financial incentive for misreporting the 
result and the reports made do not differ significantly from expected outcomes with random 
draws.  On the other hand, reports when there are financial incentives to cheat generally show 
considerable evidence of lying on the reports made.  In addition, we study cheating in the absence 
of payoff externalities, in that only one’s own material payoff is affected by reported outcome. 
We do not find evidence of loss aversion in our environment.  There is no difference in 
behavior across gain and loss frames when payment is simply made at the end of the session.  
More remarkably, when we endow participants with prospective payment in advance, there is 
substantially less cheating in the loss frame.  We presume that the observed behavior represents 
differences in the moral cost of cheating, reflected by either some form of guilt aversion or a 
desire to have a favorable self-image or social image. 
The moral cost of dishonest behavior is an element that must not be ignored and this goes 
beyond simple considerations such as the distance of one’s report from the truth or guilt for 
disappointing others and affecting their earnings.  We expect more research will follow on this 
theme, as it is critical to understanding cheating and corruption in the world at large. 
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 Table 4: Regression analysis 
 (1) 
Pooled data 
(2) 
No Manipulation 
(3) 
Manipulation 
(4) 
Gains 
(5)          
Losses 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Constant 6.624*** 6.332*** 6.628*** 6.271*** 5.368*** 5.820*** 6.636*** 6.809*** 6.678*** 6.334*** 
 (0.459) (0.484) (0.480) (0.558) (0.127) (0.444) (0.231) (0.275) (0.534) (0.546) 
Gain 0.061 0.439 0.061 0.585 0.757** 0.724**     
 (0.505) (0.479) (0.527) (0.478) (0.365) (0.337)     
Money manipulation -1.254*** -0.964**     -0.531 -1.023*** -1.285** -1.078** 
 (0.476) (0.465)     (0.386) (0.315) (0.553) (0.529) 
Gain ×Money manipulation  0.696 0.0257         
 (0.605) (0.570)         
           
Control previous experiment No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
           
Sigma  3.350*** 3.342*** 3.376*** 3.354*** 3.326*** 3.304*** 3.043*** 3.022*** 3.685*** 3.682*** 
 (0.187) (0.191) (0.197) (0.207) (0.345) (0.342) (0.197) (0.200) (0.192) (0.192) 
           
Pseudo LL -762.751 -762.936 -380.477 -379.411 -382.262 -382.158 -386.015 -384.747 -374.673 -374.589 
# of obs.(uncensored) 338(257) 
 
338(257) 
 
173(126) 
 
173(126) 
 
165(131) 
 
165(131) 
 
173(137) 
 
173(137) 
 
165 (120) 
 
165(120) 
 
Notes: Specification (1) includes data from all treatments except the Baseline. Specification (2) includes data from only the Gain-NO and Loss-NO treatments to 
investigate whether the frame has an effect on cheating when subjects do not manipulate the money and receive the earnings from the experimenter, while (3) includes 
data only from the Gain-MM and Loss-MM treatments to see whether cheating in the gain and loss treatments differ when subjects manipulate their earnings. 
Specification (4) includes data only from the Gain-NO and Gain-MM treatments to see the effect the money manipulation in the gain treatment, (5) includes only data 
from the Loss-NO and Loss-MM treatments to see the effect of the money manipulation in the Loss treatments.  ** and *** indicate significance at the p = 0.05 and p = 
0.01 levels, respectively, two-tailed tests. 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Experimental Instructions (originally in Spanish) 
 
BASELINE TREATMENT 
 
Instructions (to be read aloud) 
The aim of this experiment is to study decision-making. We are not interested in your particular choices but rather on 
the individual’s average behavior. Thus, all through the experiment you will be treated anonymously. Neither the 
experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know your particular choices.  
 
Next, you will receive the instructions and a 10-sided die. Instructions should be easy to follow. Please read the 
instructions carefully and raise your hand if you have any doubt, as it is important that you understand the instructions 
before starting the experiment. 
 
Instructions 
 
The aim of this experiment is to study decision-making. We are not interested in your particular choices but rather on 
the individual’s average behavior. Thus, all through the experiment you will be treated anonymously. Neither the 
experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know your particular choices. Please do not think that we expect a 
particular behavior from you. However, take into account that your decisions along the experiment may affect your 
earnings. Below, you will find details of your task in this experiment. Please follow the instructions carefully, as it is 
important that you understand the experiment before starting. Talking with each other is forbidden during the 
experiment. If you have any questions, raise your hand and remain silent. You will be attended by the instructor as 
soon as possible. 
 
What is the experiment about? 
Your task consists on throwing the 10-sided dice that you received memorizing the number that you obtain in the first 
throw. This number will determine your earnings as is shown in the table below. 
  
Number 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Amount 2.50 € 2.50 € 2.50 € 2.50 € 2.50 € 2.50 € 2.50 € 2.50 € 2.50 € 2.50 € 
 
This means that you will earn 2.50€ regardless of the number that you report. 
First, we ask you to roll the dice and memorize the number you obtain in the first throw. 
Then, introduce this number in the computer screen.  
You can throw the dice as many times as you want to test that it works properly. Still, your payment depends only on the 
number you report for the first throw. 
At the end of the experiment, you will receive your earnings (in an anonymous way) in a sealed envelope.  
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GAIN-NO TREATMENT 
 
Instructions (to be read aloud after the first experiment) 
The aim of this experiment is to study decision-making. We are not interested in your particular choices but rather on 
the individual’s average behavior. Thus, all through the experiment you will be treated anonymously. Neither the 
experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know your particular choices.  
 
Next, you will receive the instructions and a 10-sided die. Instructions should be easy to follow. Please read the 
instructions carefully and raise your hand if you have any doubt as it is important that you understand the instructions 
before starting the experiment. 
 
Instructions (to be read privately)  
 
The aim of this experiment is to study decision-making. We are not interested in your particular choices but rather on 
the individual’s average behavior. Thus, all through the experiment you will be treated anonymously. Neither the 
experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know your particular choices. Please do not think that we expect a 
particular behavior from you. However, take into account that your decisions along the experiment may affect your 
earnings. Below, you will find details of your task in this experiment. Please follow the instructions carefully, as it is 
important that you understand the experiment before starting. Talking with each other is forbidden during the 
experiment. If you have any questions, raise your hand and remain silent. You will be attended by the instructor as 
soon as possible. 
 
What is the experiment about? 
Your task consists on throwing the 10-sided dice that you received memorizing the number that you obtain in the first 
throw. This number will determine your earnings as is shown in the table below. 
 
Number 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Amount 0 € 1 € 1.50 € 2 € 2.50 € 3 € 3.50 € 4 € 4.50 € 5 € 
 
This means that you will earn 0 € if the number you report is 0, 1 € if the number you report is 1, 1.50€ if the number 
you report is 2, so on, obtaining an amount of 5 € if you report a 9. 
First, we ask you to roll the dice and memorize the number you obtain in the first throw. 
Then, introduce this number in the computer screen.  
You can throw the dice as many times as you want to test that it works properly. Still, your payment depends only on the 
number you report for the first throw. 
At the end of the experiment, you will receive your earnings (in an anonymous way) in a sealed envelope.  
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LOSS-NO TREATMENT 
Welcome (to be read aloud at the beginning of the session) 
 
Welcome to the lab! Today, you have received an initial amount of 5 Euros for participating in an experiment that 
follows the one that is about to start. From now, this money belongs to you. Next, we will explain to you the instructions 
of the first experiment.  
(Subjects participate in the first experiment) 
Instructions (to be read aloud after the first experiment) 
The aim of this experiment is to study decision-making. We are not interested in your particular choices but rather on 
the individual’s average behavior. Thus, all through the experiment you will be treated anonymously. Neither the 
experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know your particular choices.  
 
Next, you will receive the instructions and a 10-sided die. Instructions should be easy to follow. Please read the 
instructions carefully and raise your hand if you have any doubt as it is important that you understand the instructions 
before starting the experiment. 
 
What is the experiment about? 
Before starting the experiment you received 5€.  
Your task consists on throwing the 10-sided dice that you received memorizing the number that you obtain in the first 
throw. This number will determine your earnings as is shown in the table below. 
 
Number 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Amount -5 € -4 € -3.50 € -3 € -2.50 € -2 € -1.50 € -1 € -0.50 € -0 € 
 
This means that you will return 5 € if the number you report is 0, 4 € if the number you report is 1, 3.50€ if the number 
you report is 2, so on, returning an amount of 0 € if you report a 9. 
First, we ask you to roll the dice and memorize the number you obtain in the first throw. 
Then, introduce this number in the computer screen. We shall subtract the amount that you need to return from your 
initial 5 Euros. 
You can throw the dice as many times as you want to test that it works properly, still your payment depends only on the 
number you report for the first throw. 
At the end of the experiment, you will receive your earnings (in an anonymous way) in a sealed envelope.  
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GAIN-MM TREATMENT 
 
Instructions (to be read aloud after the first experiment) 
The aim of this experiment is to study decision-making. We are not interested in your particular choices but rather on 
the individual’s average behavior. Thus, all through the experiment you will be treated anonymously. Neither the 
experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know your particular choices.  
 
Next, you will receive the instructions, an envelope with 5 Euros and a 10-sided die. Instructions should be easy to 
follow. Please read the instructions carefully and raise your hand if you have any doubt as it is important that you 
understand the instructions before starting the experiment. 
 
(The envelope was left on the table when instructions were given to participants. We underline the sentence to 
highlight differences with respect to other treatments.) 
 
Instructions (to be read privately)  
 
The aim of this experiment is to study decision-making. We are not interested in your particular choices but rather on 
the individual’s average behavior. Thus, all through the experiment you will be treated anonymously. Neither the 
experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know your particular choices. Please do not think that we expect a 
particular behavior from you. However, take into account that your decisions along the experiment may affect your 
earnings. Below, you will find details of your task in this experiment. Please follow the instructions carefully, as it is 
important that you understand the experiment before starting. Talking with each other is forbidden during the 
experiment. If you have any questions, raise your hand and remain silent. You will be attended by the instructor as 
soon as possible. 
 
What is the experiment about? 
Your task consists on throwing the 10-sided dice that you received memorizing the number that you obtain in the first 
throw. This number will determine your earnings as is shown in the table below. 
 
Number 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Amount 0 € 1 € 1.50 € 2 € 2.50 € 3 € 3.50 € 4 € 4.50 € 5 € 
 
This means that you will earn 0 € if the number you report is 0, 1 € if the number you report is 1, 1.50€ if the number 
you report is 2, so on, obtaining an amount of 5 € if you report a 9. 
 
First, we ask you to roll the dice and memorize the number you obtain in the first throw. 
 
Then, report this number using the computer screen. There is an envelope with 5 Euros on your table. Take the money 
that corresponds to your throw and sealed it. 
 
You can throw the dice as many times as you want to test that it works properly, still your payment depends only on 
the number you reported for the first throw. 
At the end of the experiment, the instructor will pick up the sealed envelopes when you leave the room. Your earnings 
will be anonymous.  
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LOSS-MM TREATMENT 
(Subjects are given 5 Euros when entering the room) 
 
Welcome (to be read aloud at the beginning of the session) 
Welcome to the lab! Today, you have received an initial amount of 5 Euros for participating in an experiment that 
follows the one that is about to start. From now, this money belongs to you. Next, we will explain to you the instructions 
of the first experiment.  
(We observe that roughly 1/3of the subjects decided to leave the money on the table, while 2/3 of the subjects kept it in 
their pockets or bags. Subjects participate in the first experiment. After finishing the first experiment, we ask subjects to 
take their endowment and put it on the table.) 
Instructions (to be read aloud after the first experiment) 
The aim of this experiment is to study decision-making. We are not interested in your particular choices but rather on 
the individual’s average behavior. Thus, all through the experiment you will be treated anonymously. Neither the 
experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know your particular choices.  
 
Next, you will receive the instructions, an empty envelope and a 10-sided die. Instructions should be easy to follow. 
Please read the instructions carefully and raise your hand if you have any doubt as it is important that you understand 
the instructions before starting the experiment. 
  
(The envelope was left on the table when instructions were given to participants. We underline the sentence to 
highlight differences with respect to other treatments.)  
 
What is the experiment about? 
Before starting the experiment you received 5€.  
Your task consists on throwing the 10 sided dice that you received memorizing the number that you obtain in the first 
throw. This number will determine your earnings as is shown in the table below. 
 
Number 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Amount -5 € -4 € -3.50 € -3 € -2.50 € -2 € -1.50 € -1 € -0.50 € -0 € 
 
This means that you will return 5 € if the number you report is 0, 4 € if the number you report is 1, 3.50€ if the number 
you report is 2, so on, returning an amount of 0 € if you report a 9. 
First, we ask you to roll the dice and memorize the number you obtain in the first throw. 
Then, introduce this number in the computer screen. Place the amount that you need to return in the envelope and sealed 
it.  
You can throw the dice as many times as you want to test that it works properly, still your payment depends only on 
number obtained on the first throw. 
At the end of the experiment, the instructor will pick up the envelopes. Your earnings will be anonymous. 
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Appendix B 
 
B1. Previous task 
Recall that our experiment is preceded by a previous (unrelated) task. Our data come from two previous 
experiments.  
• Experiment 1 (Rodriguez-Lara and Ponti, 2017). This experiment has a total of 3 phases. In Phases 
1 and 2, the authors elicit (individual) risk and time preferences using multiple-choice lists. In 
Phase 3, subjects are matched in pairs and one of them (randomly selected as “Dictator”) has to 
decide whether members of the pair receive the money immediately or in a future period. All 
subjects receive 5 Euros for participating in this experiment. In addition, some subjects are paid for 
their choices either in the risk or the intertemporal task. If subjects are paid for the later, the 
amount can be paid either the day of the experiment or in future (all payments are done using bank 
transfers). The aim of the paper is to study social time preferences. In particular, the authors want 
to investigate how subjects trade intertemporal payoffs for themselves and/or others, controlling 
for risk aversion.   
 
• Experiment 2 (Kinateder, Kiss and Pintér 2017; Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara and Rosa-Garcia 2018). In 
these experiments, subjects are matched in groups of three to play a bank-run game. Subjects face 
a situation that resembles a coordination problem in which they have to decide whether to 
withdraw their money from a common bank or keep it deposited. The most efficient outcome is the 
one in which subjects keep their money deposited in the bank but doing so is risky if the rest of 
depositors withdraw; i.e., subjects may be better withdrawing than waiting alone. The authors 
consider two different settings: a sequential setting (where decisions are made in sequence and 
subjects can observe the decision of others) and simultaneous (where subjects decide without 
knowing what others in their bank have done). In both settings, choices are elicited using the 
strategy method. More precisely, subjects participating in the sequential version of the game are 
asked to decide what to do if they are the first ones in the line, the second ones and observe that the 
first depositor waited/withdrew, etc… In the simultaneous setting, depositors only know their 
position in the line and have to decide whether or not to withdraw without conditioning this choice 
to the action of any other depositor. The authors investigate the determinants of withdrawing 
decisions and whether subjects are willing to pay to signal their decision in the simultaneous 
setting.   
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B2. Reports and influence of the previous task  
 
In our experiment, we have a total of 426 participants: 192 subjects participated in Experiment 1 (social 
time preferences) and 234 participated in Experiment 2 (bank runs). Figure B1 presents the distribution of 
the reported numbers from those who participated in each experiment. We observe no differences in the 
behavior of subjects in the die-task using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Z = 1.270, p = 0.204). The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test yields the same results (KS = 0.089, p = 0.328).  
 
Figure B1: Distribution of reported numbers depending on previous experiment 
 
 
 
Apart from the type of experiment, the role of subjects could also affect the reported numbers. When we 
look at Experiment 1, we see that those who were randomly selected as Dictators in Phase 3 of the 
experiment do not report different numbers than those who were randomly selected as Recipients at any 
common significance level (Z = 0.346, p = 0.730; KS = 0.508, p = 0.926). Similarly, participants in the 
sequential and the simultaneous version of the bank-run game of Experiment 2 do not behave differently 
with regard to the reported numbers (Z = 0.148, p = 0.138; KS = 0.109, p = 0.481). These findings, in turn, 
suggest that the type of experiment or the role of participants do not affect their reports in the subsequent 
task.  
 
Finally, we test whether the earnings in the previous experiment affects the reports; in fact, participating in 
Experiment 1 earn more than those in Experiment 2 on average (€17.31 vs €7.85, p < 0.001). Table B4 
presents the correlation between previous earnings and the reports. This is never significant (p > 0.165). 
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Table B1: Correlation between reported outcomes and previous earnings 
Treatment Baseline Gain-NO Loss-NO Gain-MM Loss-MM 
Correlation -0.125 
(0.245) 
-0.148 
(0.165) 
-0.028 
(0.802) 
-0.068 
(0.541) 
-0.004 
(0.971) 
 
 
B3. Robustness checks 
 
In Section 3, we use a !!test to investigate whether the reported outcomes differ from the expected ones 
(i.e., the equal distribution). In the first columns of Table B1, we show that our results are robust to the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Z) and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (!") test of cumulative distributions, except for 
the Loss-MM treatment, where the one-tailed comparisons between the reports and the expected actual 
outcomes come close to statistical significance.23 The third column of Table B2 reports the fraction of 
subjects who cheat to avoid the worst possible outcome using the estimation method in Garbarino, Slonim 
and Villeval (2016). 
 
Table B2. Non-parametric analysis and fraction of cheaters in each treatment 
Treatment Z KS % cheaters 
Baseline 1.099  
(0.272) 
1.810  
(0.405) 
 
Gain-NO 4.095*** 
(0.000) 
14.056*** 
(0.000) 
62.43% 
Loss-NO 3.886***  
(0.000) 
15.454***  
 (0.000) 
48.37% 
Gain-MM 3.296*** 
(0.001) 
12.448***   
(0.001) 
60.12% 
Loss-MM 1.563* 
 (0.059) 
3.459* 
(0.089) 
21.99% 
Notes. * and *** indicate significance at the p = 0.10 and p = 0.01 levels, respectively. p-values 
are reported in brackets 
 
 
 
                                                            
23 We assume that the number of observations is 85 and perform one-tailed analysis, except for the Baseline 
treatment, where we consider a two-tailed hypothesis.  
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 In Table B3, we undertake the approach in Ezquerra, Kolev and Rodriguez-Lara (2018) to 
investigate whether there is cheating in each of the five treatments. Ezquerra, Kolev and Rodriguez-Lara 
(2018) consider a linear regression model where the dependent variable is the standardized die outcome; 
i.e., they subtract the theoretical expected value of the die roll outcome (4.5), and divide by the theoretical 
standard deviation of the die outcome (2.872). The test statistics are computed with Eicker–White robust to 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity covariance matrix, which is necessary because given that the dependent 
variable has limited range (integers from 0 to 9). The estimated parameters in the model have the 
interpretation of amount of cheating that takes place in each treatment in units of standard deviation; e.g., 
in the Baseline treatment the observed average die outcome is 0.166 of one theoretical standard deviation 
above the theoretical expected die outcome. 
 
Table B3. Standardized die outcome: Linear regression 
 
Treatment b t-stat p-value 
Baseline 0.166 (0.106) 1.57 (0.117) 
Gain-NO 0.454*** (0.141) 3.21 (0.001) 
Loss-NO 0.431*** (0.146) 2.94 (0.003) 
Gain-MM 0.339** (0.142) 2.39 (0.017) 
Loss-MM 0.0767 (0.157) 0.49 (0.625) 
    
# of obs. 426   
R-squared 0.038   
Notes. Dependent variable is the standardized die outcome, (Die Outcome—
Theoretical Expectation of Die Outcome)/(Theoretical Standard Deviation of 
Die Outcome) = (Die Outcome—4.5)/2.872. We use *, ** and *** to indicate 
statistical significance at the p = 0.10, p = 0.05 and p = 0.01 levels, 
respectively. p-values are reported in brackets in the last column.  
 
The results suggest that there is no significant cheating in the Baseline and the Loss-MM treatments, but 
cheating is significant in the Gain-No, Loss-NO and Gain-MM treatments.  In line with previous evidence, 
there is no support for loss aversion when there is no money manipulation, as the amount of cheating in the 
Gain-NO and Loss-NO is not statistically different (p = 0.867). In addition, subjects cheat less in the Loss-
MM than in the Gain-MM (p = 0.079).   
 
  9 
Finally, we use the Baseline as the benchmark. Our econometric analysis in Table 3 relies on the 
comparison between the behavior in the Gain and the Loss treatments, with and without the manipulation 
of money but we have run a Baseline treatment in which subjects had no incentives to misreport the 
outcome. We can look at whether reported outcomes in each of the treatments differ from the ones reported 
in the Baseline treatment using a Tobit analysis. Our results are summarized in Table B4. In this case, the 
set of independent variables include dummies for our treatment conditions (the omitted category is then the 
Baseline treatment). The reported standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the session level. These 
results are robust to controlling for the previous experiment.  
Table B4: Regression analysis (using the Baseline as the benchmark) 
 
 (1)  
Pooled data 
(2)  
No Manipulation 
(3)  
Manipulation  
(4) 
Gains 
(5)          
Losses 
Constant 5.079*** 5.079*** 5.077*** 5.070*** 5.087*** 
 (0.203) (0.209) (0.208) (0.203) (0.215) 
Gain-NO 1.602*** 1.602***  1.578***  
 (0.392) (0.410)  (0.396)  
Loss-NO 1.541*** 1.541***   1.563*** 
 (0.502) (0.524)   (0.522) 
Gain-MM 1.046***  1.045*** 1.041***  
 (0.372)  (0.376) (0.384)  
Loss-MM 0.289  0.288  0.294 
 (0.241)  (0.241)  (0.247) 
      
Sigma  3.326*** 3.326*** 3.297***  3.515*** 
 (0.146) (0.130) (0.212)  (0.158) 
      
Pseudo LL -973.023 -590.762 -592.508 -596.425 -585.544 
 
# of obs. (uncensored) 426 (332) 
 
261 (201) 253 (206) 261 (212) 253 (195) 
  
 Our regression (1) suggests that reports in all the treatments are statistically different from the 
Baseline (p < 0.01) except for the Loss-MM treatment (p = 0.231).  Pairwise comparisons confirm that 
there is no significant difference between reports in Gain-NO and Loss-NO (p = 0.674), while there is a 
significant difference between the reports in the Gain-MM and Loss-MM treatments (p = 0.016).  We also 
see that there is a significant difference between the reports in the Loss-NO and Loss-MM treatments (p = 
0.003), while the difference between the reports in the Gain-NO and Gain-MM treatments is weakly 
significant (p = 0.062), this suggesting that the manipulation of money can also have an effect in the Gain 
treatments in the direction predicted by Hypothesis 4.  
 
